I said not too long ago that I was going to delete this Tumblr. Later I decided against it.. at least not until I correct a few mistakes in my last attempt at trying to give insight on an ethical theory. Now, I advocate for non-naturalism and ethical intuitionism in the fashion of Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, W.D. Ross, and, of course, my favorite, Michael Huemer.
Introduction:
The two branches of ethics that pertain to this are: normative ethics and metaethics. The former being about what exactly it means to be ethical, what the standard of good is, and other inquiries like those. Metaethics, on the other hand, is a more epistemological attempt at understanding HOW we know what is good.
First and foremost, non-naturalism holds that morals are objective facts. That is to say, there is no room for subjectivism or nihilism. Secondly, it holds that metaethical theory must be arrived at a priori. This means that no experiences can prove the existence of these objective facts. This flies directly in the face of the growing popularity of scientism. Lastly, non-naturalists hold an internalist view of ethical motivation, as well as the belief that there are some self-evident truths. This means that people ought to be motivated to do something ethical simply because it is ethical, and that unlike most ethical theories, there is no single first principle, rather it is a form of pluralism.
Normative ethics:
The answer of a non-naturalist, pertaining to the standard of morality, or defining what exactly good is, may disappoint many people. The answer is simply that good is good. Good is indefinable. This is not the same as good being undefinable or not having a definition. It does not mean that good simply conveys an attitude towards something as the non-cognitivists would have one believe. Good just cannot be broken down to a definition that does not have synonymous words in it. The concept of a horse, for instance, can be broken down and dissected into different parts to make a whole. Yellow or orange, on the other hand, cannot be broken down into any other parts. G.E. Moore writes, “The most important sense of ‘definition’ is that which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in that sense ‘good’ has no definition because it is simple and has no parts.” Many things are incapable of a definition such as the one Moore speaks of. For instance, colors, emotions, and most interestingly, knowledge itself seems to be indefinable (as seen by the Gettier cases). It seems nearly impossible to define love, hate, roundness, hardness, or colors, all of which are characteristics and traits of other things. Furthermore, is it possible to explain hardness? Someone may be able to chuck a stone at somebody’s head to prove its existence, but at most, this person has presupposed the existence of hardness and shown that the stone itself is hard. This has no bearing on the existence of hardness, though. No precise definition is available, let alone a definition which does not consist of a simple definition that Moore talks about.
Moore subtly hints at something else that is important. He writes, “[Good] is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of a definition must be defined.” The importance of this is to show that non-naturalism may be seen as a form of foundationalism. That is to say, somethings are irreducible because there cannot be an infinite number of definitions. To say that everything is reducible, or everything has a precise definition, is to commit a fallacy of infinite regression. Eventually, there must be a stopping point.
This inquiry is not meant to prove what is good or how something is good. Rather just to show that goodness is a characteristic, rather than a complex (made up of two or more parts) concept. Good is something that is INDEFINABLE (not to be mistaken with undefinable) property just as hate, love, yellow, red, solid, or roundness are.
Metaethics:
In metaethical theory, non-naturalists typically lean towards ethical intuitionism. Intuition is often seen as a scary, abstract, imprecise word that many people use to describe bizarre things. However, in philosophy, it is not used in that same sense. A woman’s “intuition” is not that same as an intuition in a philosophical sense. An intuition comes pre-reasoning. It is the initial appearance of how something seems. This does not mean that it has to be observable (for instance, 32*2 does not seem to be 666). This is also does not mean that intuitions are infallible. Before reasoning is possible, there must be an initial appearance, and an intuition is that appearance. Once the intuition is comprehended, reasoning may begin taking place.
Michael Huemer equates an intuition with his theory of phenomenal conservatism. This theory states that “If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.” Not only does this seem reasonable to believe, it would be self-defeating to argue against it, because it must seem to be wrong to that person. However, there are some other objections to ethical intuitionism.
Tara Smith, an objectivist philosopher, criticizes it on the grounds that intuitionists believe that all moral truths are self-evident. This is untrue, but there is some reason to believe that an intuitionist might believe that. H.A. Prichard, an intuitionist, made a comment that seemed to imply that, but it is probably not what he meant. What the intuitionists believe is that there are SOME self-evident moral truths. Some can be found in the writings of W.D. Ross. Intuitionists deny that there is a single starting point of morality (for instance, a hedonist or utilitarian would argue that only pleasure is intrinsically good and is the starting point of ethics). Ross believes some self-evident moral truths are the duty of keeping promises, paying back somebody that one caused harm to, the duty to not harm others, and a few others. What’s important to note is the difference in a Kantian deontological ethical theory. While these are intrinsically good, this does not mean that they must always be kept. Immanual Kant believed that people ought to always tell the truth, even if it put another persons life at risk. Ross might say that the duty to be honest does not override the duty to not cause harm. If the information put another person at risk, the duty to be honest is not applicable.
The other popular criticism is the spookiness of intuitionism. Some appear to believe that it is some odd, abstract thing. Something that cannot be defined or trusted. Imagine for a moment that philosophers did not treat moral facts any different than other facts. As noted before, somethings just have not been defined. Knowledge is a good example. Yet, it is still believe that knowledge exists and that people have it. Philosophers seem to put morality on a pedestal. While this is admirable, it is mistaken. Moral truths ought to be treated like any other truth. Ethical truths are no different than any other truths.
Naturalistic ethics:
Why not utilitarianism, hedonism, or egoism? G.E. Moore popularized the argument against all naturalist ethics (i.e. ethical theories that defined good as something other than itself) called the open question argument. The open question argument is meant to show that open questions do no betray the concepts used in the question. A closed question, on the other hand, does betray the concepts used in the question. For instance, “is pleasure good?” is an open question. This seems to be something that can be discussed, argued, and reasoned over. However, “is this bachelor married?” is a closed question. This cannot be discussed, argued, or reasoned over. A bachelor must be unmarried. A better example might be, if someone were to say that “pleasure is the only good,” one might respond with the question, “do you really mean that which brings ones pleasure brings one pleasure?” This should not be so controversial, especially in the context that Plato used it in. The divine command theory says that Gods commands are good. Plato would then ask, “so when you say God is good, do you mean that God obeys His own commands?” This has been accepted by most philosophers. Even Christian philosophers accept that argument as logically valid, they just dispute the truth of the premises.
Secondly, utilitarianism, egoism, and hedonism are all counter-intuitive. The question a utilitarian might be forced to rape somebody who is unconscious. If the person unconscious is unlikely to wake up or remember the event, the person, may be morally obligated to become the rapist. Yes, this may cause psychological or sleeping problems, however, there are at least two cases in which a utilitarian, if being consistent with utilitarianism, must accept that rape was obligatory. The first in the case of a young girl in Canada who was raped, at least, 2 times, by a trusted friend. The girl was invited over, she came, was drugged then raped, woke up going home thinking she may have drank too much. This happened again after she accepted the invitation from her rapist. The second case involved a serial rapist from New Mexico. The victim had no idea she was raped, rather just thought them to be nightmares. It wasn’t until the FBI came to the victims door, did she find out she was raped (which is another interesting challenge to utilitarianism, should the FBI told that person what had happened if it were to bring her more pain?) However, lets grant the utilitarian to be right about psychological damages outweighing the pleasure gained by the perpetuator. The utilitarian then can only argue that the act was only wrong because it brought displeasure to the victim in the form of dreams. This seems untrue. However, lets present the utilitarian with another dilemma. Imagine that a doctor is taking care of five dying patients. They will surely die if they do not receive transplants. For the sake of the argument, assume all of the patients have different medical problems. Should the doctor kill one patient to save all 5 of them? The intuitive answer is no. Many of these situations are also applicable to a hedonist. A hedonist may find it morally obligatory to rape, pillage, murder, etc.
An egoist is a slightly different case. However, this does not save it from equally counter-intuitive beliefs. Imagine that a person could profit just $1 from killing an innocent person as a contract killer. Assume all the costs were $100 worth the time, the effort, the expenses, etc. and the pay was $101. There is nothing logically consistent with saying that the contract killer should not kill that person. There is a net gain, and because all that is morally obligatory is for that person to be better off, it seems that the person should kill the other person. One might try to argue that there is a great risk of killing that person which would not be worth it and may outweigh the benefit. However, is this really the time and place for a cost-benefit analysis? It seems to be wrong to kill an innocent person. Rather than arguing, the contract killer should only kill the innocent person if the chances are low enough, is scary and counter-intuitive. Ayn Rand seemed to have desperately try to find a logical connection between egoism and non-violence, but while she was correct in rejecting violence, she was wrong in accepting egoism.
Conclusion:
The biggest issue with these ethical theories is the attempt to reduce morality down to one single principle. To say that ONLY x is THE good. There seems to be good evidence against that, and more evidence towards a pluralistic morality such as non-naturalism and ethical intuitionism. Despite the complaints of the spookiness, or the fact that non-naturalists don’t define “good,” it seems to be the most reasonable ethical theories available today.
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